PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE

REPORTS.
ALIENS.
In re Johnson'sEstate, 73 Pac. 424, the Supreme Court of
California holds that an alien has no right to raise the
Constitution.

question whether a statute is violative of the

provision of the United States Constitution
which declares that the citizens of each state
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. Such provi.ion, it is said, affords no protection to aliens or citizens of the United
States who are citizens of a territory. One judge dissents.
See Sprague v. Fletchcr,69 Vt. 69.
aity

of Statute

ASSAULT.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Hoy v. State,
96 N. W. 228, that a person attacked or formidably threatened by three persons acting in concert may
Self-D.fanso
avail himself of the right of self-defense by

using commensurate force against the nearest assailant,
although it is not from him, but from the others, that
great bodily harm is apprehended. Further, it is decided
that the right of self-defense does not belong alone to
persons engaged in the pursuit of their lawful business. It
is available to every person, regardless of the nature of
his business, who is assaulted, or who, upon just grounds,
apprehends an immediate unlawful attack.
BANKRUPTCY.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Intcrnational Harvestcr Co. of Anerica v. Lyman, 96 N. W. 87. adhering to
Revival of
the general rule that to revive a debt which has
Debt
been discharged in bankruptcy a conditional
promise thereafter to pay the original obligation in installments must be accepted by the creditor, holds that where,
after such discharge, in response to an offer by the debtor
788
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BANKRUPTCY (Continued).

to pay the original obligation in installments, the creditor
expressly declines to assent to the conditions, and insists
upon payment of the whole amount, the debt is not revived. See Smith v. Stanchfield, 84 Minn. 343.
BANKS.

With one judge dissenting, the New York Supreme
Court (App. Div., First Dept.) holds in T. B. Clark Co. v.
RIefusal to

JMit. Morris Bank, 83 N. Y. Supp. 447, that in

arf action against a bank for damages caused
by its refusal to pay a check and note of the plaintiff where
thiere was a sufficient deposit to the pl2.ntiff's credit, and it
appearcd that the refusal was the result of a clerk's mistake. and there was no allegation of special damage, only
nominal damages could be recovered. See Davis v. Standard Bank, 50 App. Div. 210.
Pay Check

BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATIONS.

- A contract between a beneficial association and a member was made with reference to the by-laws and regulations of the association. One of the by-laws
Right- Under provided that any beneficiary considering himBy-Laws
self aggrieved by the decision of the grand executive committee in respect to a claim for benefits must
appeal to the grand council. In Wcigand v. Fratcrnities
.- ccidcnt Order, 55 Atlantic, 530, the Court of Appeals of
.Maryland holds that a beneficiary who fails to appeal, as
--rovided for in the by-laws, could not maintain an action
at law on her claim. See Vandyke's Case, 2 Whart. 312.
BURDEN OF PROOF.

i, a civil action to recover damages for an assault comrrit:eil with a loaded firearm, the presumption of defendCiil Action:
Assaut

ant'sinnocence until he is proven guiltybeyond

a reasonable doubt, applicable in criminal cases,
doe-q not apply: the plaintiff being reqmired only to prove
his cause by a preponderance of the evidence: New York
Supreme Court (App. Div., Second Dep.) in Kurz v. Doerr,
-q3 N. Y. Supp. 736. As to the general question involved,
the court says that the English rule is otherwise, but that
the o.e adopted is approved by the great weight of Ameri-
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can authority. It is said, however, that in New York there
is a lack of harmony and no really authoritative decision
upon the subject. See Johnson v. Agricultural Insurance
Co., 25 Hun. 251.
CARRIERS.

It is the duty of a carrier of passengers to exercise reasonable and ordinary care in looking after and protecting
one who becomes sick or unconscious while a
Passengers*
e

asncr

hte

passengcr.
Whether such care has been exercised is ordinarily

a question of fact for the
jury. See A, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. WVcbcr, 33 Kan. 543.
The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Missouri, K. &
T. Ry. Co. v. Orton, 73 Pac. 63, that a carrier is not liable
for injury to a passenger from a cinder from
Injury to
Passnger
the locomotive coming through an open door
of a car, the locomotive being in good repair and equipped
with the best spark arrester, and beir.g properly and skillfully managed and Gperated, and the proof not warranting
a finding of culpable negligence in the carrier's having the
door open. This case differs from the Pennsylvania case of
Pennsylvania R. Co. %.MacKinney, 124 Pa. 462, in the fact
that in that case it did not appear from where the object
came that hit the passenger.
In Memphis ATe',vs Pub. Co. v. Southcrn Ry. Co., 75 S. W.
941, it appeared that a railroad con'pany contracted with a
Unlawful Dis- newspaper publisher, agreeing to run a special
crimination

early morning train carrying only the news-

papers of the publisher, in consideration of the publishing
company guaranteeing to i: a certain revenue from the
operation of the train This train became one of its scheduled trains, and was advertised as such. It was controlled
exclusively by the company, and all the revenue derived
from its operation in the carrying of passengers and freight
was its property. Under the circumstances, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee holds that the railroad could not, relying on its contract, refuse to carry on such trains newspapers tendered it by a rival publishing house, which
offered to comply with all the conditions as to guaranty,
indemnity, etc., complied with by the house making the
contract. Such refusal, it is held, constitutes an illegal
discrimination between persons of the same class. The
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fact that the publishing company solicited the institution
of the train service and supported it by a large outlay of
money during its early days did not change the rule, nor
make the train a special one, chartered for a special purpose. The case presents a very satisfactory review of the
questions involed. See in connection with it Audenried
v. Philadelphia& Reading R. R., 68 Pa. 370.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland holds in Western
Maryland R. Co. v. Schaun, 55 Atlantic, 701, that where a
Tickets: Description of
Holder

passenger was ejected from a railroad train by
reason of a defect in her return ticket, in fail-

ing to properly describe her personal characteristics, which resulted from the conductor's negligence
in punching said return on the going trip, such passenger
was only entitled to recover damages in an action for
breach of contract, and could not recover in .an action ex
delicto. See Hufford v. Grand Rapids & I. Ry.Co., 53 Mich.
ii8.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The law of Tennessee prohibits the sale of intoxicating
liquors within four miles of institutions of learning, but
Sale of Liquor

excepts from its operation sales by manufac-

turers in wholesale packages or quantities. In
Wcbster v. State, 75 S. W. io02o, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee holds this act constitutional, refusing to regard
it either as class legislation or as denying to all citizens the
equal protection of the law. Compare Reyinann Brewing
Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445.
CORPORATIONS.

In re First Church of Christ, Scientist, 55 Atlantic, 536,
the petitioners applied for a charter to establish a place of
Cbristian
public worship to preach the doctrine as found
Science
in the Bible and the Christian Science textbook of Mary B. G. Eddy. The evidence showed that the
purpose was not merely to establish a form of worship, but
to educate persons for treatment of disease by inaudible
prayer, and that nothing was necessary to qualify as such a
teacher except to study the system taught in the book of
Mrs. Eddy, without any knowledge of anatomy, physi-
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ology or hygiene; the theory of the system being that all
diseases, even of a contagious character, were mere beliefs. and not real facts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds that the application fdr the charter was properly denied by the lower court, as opposed to the general
policy of the state in reference to the treatment and existence of diseases.
A stockholder who has acquired stock in a corporation
by purchase cannot complain of illegal salaries paid directors prior to his becoming such stockRights of
Stockholders holder, but can complain of such grievance
thereafter occurring without his knowledge: Supreme
Court of New Mexico in Rankin v. Southwestern Brewery
& Ice Co., 73 Pacific, 614.
In Armour v. E. Bement's Sons, 123 Fed. 56, the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, holds that
Reorzaniza- a new corporation regularly organized by the
tion
officers and stockholders of an existing corporation for the purpose of acquiring its property and assets,
and which does acquire the same by purchase at judicial
sales, cannot be treated as a continuance of the old corporation, and liable at law for its debts, whatever may be its
liability in equity to creditors of the old corporation in respect to the property, if fraud if show-.- in the transfers.
COURTS.

Any court having in its possession a fund about which
there is a controversy has inherent jurisdiction and power
to determine such controversy, to the excluJurisdiction
sion of every other court: United States Crcuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, In re Antigo Screen
Door Co.,

123

Fed. 249.

DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.

In Daubert v. Western Meat Co., 73 Pac. 244, the Supreme Court of California holds that where a child is un,ecovery by born, and its existence is unknown to the deWidow
fendant in an action by its mother to recover
for the wrongful death of her husband, the father of the
child, at the time the judgment is rendered in favor of the
widow or other heirs, such judgment is a bar to a subsequent action by such child after its birth to recover for its

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT (Continued).

father's wrongful death. Two judges dissent.
N. R. Co. v. Sanders, 86 Ky. 260.

See L.

DEED.

The Supreme Court of Georgia holds in Mays v. Shields,
45 S.E. 68, that a lawful delivery being essential to the
validity of a deed where such an instrument is
Delivery:
Bona Fide
Purchaser

left in escrow and is improperly delivered by
the depositary without compliance with the

conditions on which it was to be surrendered, no title
passes to the grantee, nor will a bona fide purchaser for
value from him acquire any right as against the original
grantor, unless such grantor, having learned of such delivery, fails to take active measures to recover possession
of the deed or to have the record of the deed expunged.
Compare with this case Dixon v. Bristol Bank, 102 Ga. 461.
EVIDENCE.

In GrandLodge A. 0. U. W. v. Bartes, 96 N. W. 186, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska holds that a member of the
Pedigree

family, living therein, is presumptively qualified

as witness to prove the age and pedigree of the
other members; but when it is shown on cross-examination that the knowledge of such witness is derived, not
from family tradition and repute, but from statements
made by a stranger, the testimony should be excluded.
In Davis v. State, 35 Southern, 76, the Supreme Court
of Florida, Division B, holds that testimony as to the
action of dogs in following the trail of a supDogs
posed criminal from the scene of a crime is
admissible in ev-idence, provided such preliminary proof be
given of the qualities and trainiig of the dogs as to show
that reliance may reasonably be placed upon their accuracy in following the trail of a human being. See Pedigo v.
Coninon-wealth, 103 Ky. 41.
FIXTURES

In Duntz v. Granger Brewing Co., 83 N. Y. Supp. 957,
the New York Supreme Court (Special Term, Columbia
Mortgage
of Real

County) holds that where an owner of realty,
on a corporation furnishing chattels to him,

Estate
agreed that the title to the chattels should not
pass until paid for, such agreement operated to prevent

794

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

FIXTURES (Continued).
such chattels from becoming fixtures, unless their removal
should seriously injure them or the realty, and that where,
after an owner of land had purchased chattels under such
agreement, he executed a mortgage of 'he real estate and
the chattels as fixtures to a third person, such mortgage
was subsequent to, and did not prejudice, the lien of the
vendor of the chattels for the unpaid balance of the purchase price thereof. See Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377.

GIFTS.
A man had buried sums of money in various places about
his estate, and being ill, and barely able to walk, took his
daughter to the whereabouts of the money,
Delivery
and told her definitely the several places where
it was concealed, with a positive declaration that he gave it
to her, cautioning her not to Ict any ore else know where it
was, and advising her to leave it there until the place was
rented or she needed it. She did not remove it until after
his death. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court
of Oregon holds in Valc v. Grubbe, 73 Pac. 206, that there
was a sufficient delivery, though in answer to the father's
question whether, if he should get well and should want
some of it, his daughter would give it to him, she had answered, "Yes, if you get well you can have all of it." The
court compares the case with the symbolic delivery effected by the delivery of the key to a treasure box. See
Licbc v. Battnzann, 33 Ore. 241.

HABEAS CORPUS.
The United States Circuit Court (S. D., New York)
holds In re Rceeves. 123 Fed.343, that a ederal court will not
discharge a prisoner confined under a convicFederal
Courts
tion by a state court on a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the statutes under which the trial
was held is in violation of the Constitution of the United
States, where the state statute provides for an appeal and
for the acceptance of bail or a stay of proceedings pending
such appeal. See, in connection with this case, note on the
jurisdiction of federal courts in habeas corpus proceedings
to In re Huse, 25 C. C. A. 4.
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ILLEGAL COMBINATIONS.

The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
First Department) considers in Strauis v. Anerican PubRestriction of lishers' Ass'n, N. Y. Supp. 271, the application
Competition:

Copyright

Of a law prohibiting contracts creating monopoly to a combination between 95 per cent.

of the book publishers in the United States and Canada,
the object of which was to compel all retailers to sell their
books at a certain price fixed by the combination. It is
held that theagreement'relating only to copyrightea books
which each publisher had the sole right to sell did not take
it out of the statute; the monopoly given by the copyright
law extending only to the publication of books, and not

affecting the property right of the purchaser thereof. Two
judges dissent, one of them saying, "I do not see why a
seller of property in respect to which he has a monopoly
cannot impose any conditions as to its resale that he sees
fit." See Park & Sons Co. v. Nat. Druggists'Ass'n, 54 App.
Div. 223.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

The United States District Court (District of Nevada)
holds in United States v. Slater, 123 Fed. 115, that the act
What
of Congress making it a misdemeanor for one

Constitutes to drive live stock on foot from one state to
another, knowing them to have a contagious disease, is

within the power given to Congress to regulate interstate

commerce.
LABOR UNIONS.

In Martin v. McFall, 55 Atlantic, 465, the Court of
Chancery of New Jersey holds that attempts by members
Illecal Acf&

of a labor union to compel an employer to ac-

cede to the demands of the union as to the
mode of doing his business by persuading or inducing
others not to deal with him is unlawful, and will be enjoined.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Pursuant to the action of its board of directors, a railroad company by its president and secretary served notice
on a telegraph company of the termination of
Notice to
Qut: w&iver a lease under which the latter company had
maintained its lines on the right of way of the
railroad for twenty years, and requiring it to remove its
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poles and wires from such right of way. By the terms of
the lease the telegraph company had six months within
which to make the removal, and during that time the payment of rent by it was expressly waived. Under the circumstances the United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit, holds :n Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Pemsylvania R. Co., 123 Fed: 33, that a payment of rent
voluntarily made after the notice by the treasurer of the
telegraph company in the usual course, and accepted by
the comptroller of the railroad company, did not constitute a waiver by such company of the notice; it not appearing that such was the intention, or that the comptroller
had authority to make such waiver if he had so intended.
LIMITATIONS.

In re Cook, 83 N. Y. Supp. ioo9, the New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, Third Department) holds that
certifite of a certificate of deposit, payable on demand on
Deposit
the order of the payee, and bearing interest
provided the amount deposited was left in the bank six
months, does not mature, so as to start the statute of
limitations running against the holder's right to recover
thereon, until presentation for payment. See Cottle v. Marine Bank, 166 N. Y. 58.
MASTER AND SERVANT.

Against the dissent of one judge, it is decided in Mountain Copper Co. v. Van Buren, 123 Fed. 61, that in an action
to recover for the death of an employee killed
Injury to
Servant
by the caving in of a mine, in which there is no
question'of contributory negligence or the negligence of a
fellow-servant, but the right to recover depends solely on
the negligence of the defendant, the burden of proof on
such issue rests on the plaintiff, and the fact of the cave-in
itself carries no presumption of negligence.
MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATION.

With three judges dissenting, the Supreme Court of
Kansas holds in Millcr v. Tuttle, 73 Pac. 88, that neither a
Amendment stipulation in the application that "I further
of By-Laws
agree, if accepted as a member of the order, to
faithfully abide by its rules and regulations," nor a state-
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ment in the certificate that "this certificate is issued upon
the condition that said insured shall in every particular,
Nxhile a member of the order, comply with all the laws,
rules and regulations thereof," confers authority upon a
mutual benefit association to amend its constitution or
adopt by-laws which will modify or change the insurance contract. Before such association can do this, it is
held it must have expressly reserved such right or have
secured the express consent of the insured. See, however,
Fugure v. Mutual Society of St. Joseph, 46 Vt. 362.

NEGLIGENCE.

In Ziminer v. Fox River Valley Electric Ry. Co., 95 N.
W. 957, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin holds that a pas~atter of Law senger on a street car, required to ride on the
platform because of its crowded condition, cannot be said as a matter of law to have assumed any increased risk.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island holds in Slattery v.
Colgate, 55 Atlantic, 639, that the manufacturer of soap is
not liable for injury caused by an excess of alDefect In
Manufactured kali therein unless he know of the excess. See
Articles
in connection with this case McCaffrey v.
Mossbcrg & GranvilleMantfacturing Co., 23 R. I. 381.
In Southern Bcll Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. McTyer,
34 Southern, lO2O, the Supreme Court of Alabama holds
that where a telephone company, having preRes iv,,
Loquitur
viously maintained a telephone in a store, on
heing requested to remove the same, removed the instrument, but against the proprietor's protest neglected to remove the wires, merely twisting the ends of the wires to-ether inside the building, and by reason thereof atmospheric electricity was conducted into the store and injured
plaintiff, who was lawfully in the store on business with the
proprietor, though having no interest in the building, the
defendant's failure to remove the wires from the building
was negligence, per se, entitling plaintiff to recover for the
injury sustained.
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PARDON.

The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas holds in Lockfin v. State, 75 S. W. 305, that a pardon reciting that it is
granted because the convict's testimony is
Purposes
needed in a criminal'case is not invalid, the mo-

tives of the executive not being subject to question by the
courts.
PARTNERSHIP.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Hart v. Deitrich, 96 N. \W. 144, that a partner who, without notice to
or knowledge of his copartner, takes substantially all of the ready money of the firm and
absconds, remaining away eight months without disclosing his whereabouts, has no standing in equity to demand
an accounting after his copartner has wound up the business and paid the partnership debts.
Accounting

PATENTS.

The United States Circuit Court ( S. D., New York)
holds in Piaget Novelty Co. v. Headley, 123 Fed. Rep. 897,
Infringement:

Profits

iecoverable

that a manufacturer of an infringing article is
liable for the entire net profits derived from
a sale, where the evidence shows that its sala-

bility was primarily due to the patented feature, and in
estimating the profits realized by a defendant from the
manufacture and sale of an infringing ariticle, for which
it is accountable, it is entitled to be allowed for office and
factory rental and for labor in producing and selling the
article, but not for insurance or for legal services or expenses in defending a prior suit, although successful in
such defense.
PERJURY.

The Supreme Court of California, const .ing the provision of its code that it is no defense to :- osecution for
Sufficiency of

perjury that the oath was administered or

taken in an irregular manner, decides in People
v. Parent, 73 Pac. 423, that the fact that the words, "So
help you God," were omitted from the oath taken by the
defendant at the time he committed the perjury alleged
was immaterial. It is held that the omission was merely
formal and that the oath in either form is substantially the
same. See State v. Owen, 72 N. C. 607.
Oath
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PRISON RECORDS.

In rc Molineux, 83 N. Y. Supp. 943, the New York Supreme Court, Rensselaer County, holds that where a person was convicted of murder and while incarPhotographs cerated in the state prison his photographs
and measurements were taken, pursuant to statute, in ac-

cordance with the Bertillon system, the superintendent of
state prisons could not be compelled by mandamus, after
the prisoner's conviction had been reversed and he had
been subsequently acquitted, to surrender to him such
photographs and measurements. See Owen v. Partridge,
82 N. Y. Supp. 248.
RAILROADS.

In Pennsylvania Company v. Fislack, 123 Fed. 465, the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, defining the liability of railroad companies to
Duty of
Co-pany to their employees, holds that a railroad company
owes a positive duty to its employees with
Employees
respect to the construction and maintenance in proper repair of its tracks, cars and other appliances, but with respect to the operation of the road its duty extends no
further than to exercise ordinary care to provide a sufficient number of reasonably competent employees, make
proper rules for their government, and to exercise proper
supervision over them. When tha4 has been done, it is
not liable for any injury to an employee in the operation
of the road, through the negligence of other employees in
the operating department or their failure to observe the
rules.
RIPARIAN OWNERS.

In Scheifcrt v. Briegel, 96 N. W. 44, the court deals with
the somewhat unusual situation of facts that a lake had
Disappeara

ef Lake

entirely disappeared and it became necessary
to apportion the land previously covcred by it

among the riparian proprietors. The Supreme Court of
Minnesota holds with regard to the rule of division that
riparian owners of a non-navigable lake, the waters of
which have disappeared, own that portion of the lake bed
inclosed by extending lines from the points where the side
division lines of each respective tract cross the meandered
line to the centre of the lake. Further, that when such

OuO

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

RIPARIAN OWNERS (Continued).

lake is of irregular shape, and originally contained no inlet
or outlet, the inequalities caused by the broken shore line
should be equitably adjusted between the contiguous
owners by disregarding such irregularities, or by treating
the lake as composed of separate bodies of water, according to the conditions.
SCHOOLS.

In Louis v. Batenta., 73 Pacific, 5o9, it appeared that
school trustees had permitted the schoolhouse, when not
Dances In occupied for school purposes, to be used for
Schoolhouse private dances. The Supreme Court of Utah
holds that such trustees have no right to permit such use,
inasmuch as such conduct would be a misappropriation of
trust property and opposed to the principle that the sovereignty cannot tax for private purposes.
SERVITUDES.

The Supreme Court of Michigan holds in Austin v. Detroit, Y. & A. A. Ry., 96 N. W. 35, that an abutting owner
Abutting
has no right to compensation because the
Owners
grade of a highway is lowered for a street railroad which is built to conform thereto, though the highway is owned by a plank road company, the change of
grade being with the consent of it and of the township; nor
has such owner a right to compensation because a street
railroad is constructed, on a lowered grade, so close to the
side of the highway as to subject his fence and land to the
danger of sliding into the highway. Two judges dissent.
See Detroit St. Ry. v. Mills, 85 Mich. 634.
The New York Supreme Court (trial Term, Broome
County) holds in Gray v. New York State Telephone Co., 83
N. Y. Supp. 920, that the franchise of a teleTelephones
izi itsn
phone company, granted by the state, aathorizing its construction of a telephone line, did not authorize
it to construct its poles and wires along a country highway, in which an abutting owner has rights in common
with the public, without such owner's consent, or compensation having been first paid, since the erection of such
poles and wires constituted an additional servitude and
such abutting owners would be entitled to restraint by enjoining such construction. See Eels v. American Tel. &
Tel. Co., I43 N. NV. 133.
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STREET RAILROADS.

In IndianapolisSt. Ry. Co. v. Tener, 67 N. E. io44, the
Appeilate Court of Indiana (Division No. 2) holds that a
Relation of

person alighting from a street car on which

he was a passenger became at once a traveler
on the public street, charged with the duty of exercising
due care, and therefore, where having alighted from a street
car and passed back of it and upon the track on which
cars traveled in the opposite direction, without looking and
listening for the approach of cars, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, where he was familiar
with the manner of operating the cars on the two tracks'
One judge dissents. See in connection with this case
Howard v. Citizcns' St. Ry. Co., 29 Ind. Ap. 426.
Passenger

WILLS.
In Mansfield v. Mansfield, 67 N. E. 497, it appeared that
a will devised lands to each of the testator's children for
Power of

life, and after their death to their children in

fee, and recited that it was the testator's purpose to preserve the estate intact for the children and their
descendants, so far as possible; and it was provided that,
if circumstances should require, the persons to whom the
lands were devised should have power to sell the same to
any extent not in excess of one-third of the value of the
same. The Supreme Court of Illinois holds that under
these circumstances the will did not give a life tenant
power to sell his interest in order to pay his debts voluntarily contracted by himself.
In Trenton Trust and Safe Deposit Co. v. Donnelly, 55
Atlantic, 92, money was bequeathed in trust to pay the
Distribution interest to one for life, the corpus to go to
Disposition

of Loss

others on her death.

The corpus was dimin-

ished by unfortunate investments, and thereafter interest
on the reduced corpus alone was paid the life tenant. At the
termination of the interest of the life tenant, certain sums
due hint remaining unpaid, the question arose as to the
distribution of the loss, and the Court of Chancery of New
Jersey holds that this loss should be apportioned by paying
the reduced corpus to the remaindermen and the personal
representative of the life tenant in the proportion that the
original corpus bears to the unpaid interest on the part of
the corpus which was lost.
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A testator directed that the advancements which he had
made to each of his four children should be added to the
Construction: corpus of his estate and that the estate so increased should be divided into four parts, one of
Advancewhichwas to be apportioned toeachof the chilments
dren, after deducting the amount which had been advanced
to each respectively. It appeared that the advancements
made to one of the children, who was insolvent, were in
excess of one-fourth of the estate. Under the circumstances the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Fourth Department) holds in In re Whihnore's Will,
83 N. Y. Supp. 213, that the shares allotted to each of the
other three children should abate pro rata to make up for
the deficiency.
In Burgcss v. Shepherd, 55 Atlantic, 415, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine laying down the general principle
Construction:
Bill by
Executor

that a bill of equity to obtain the construction
of a will cannot be sustained unless the construction may affect the rights of the com-

plainant in person or property, or unless it may affect the
performance of his duties, under the will, as executor, trustee or otherwise; holds that where the complainant was executor and had no personal interest which might be affected by a construction of the will, and where the performance of his duties as executor could not be in any way
affected or aided by such a construction, the court would
not construe the will. Compare Baldwin v. Bien, 59 Me.
481.

